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A B S T R A C T
As in many other resource-rich African countries, the liberalization of the copper mining sector in the D. R.
Congo in the 2000s has caused an influx of foreign investors who have started new mining projects. Drawing
inspiration from Foucault, this article aims to shed new light on the government of such projects. To do so, it
takes as a case study the HR management policy of a mining project first developed by a South African junior
company and then bought out by a Chinese state-owned enterprise. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, the
analysis shows that putting in place HR techniques such as recruitment methods, industrial relations procedures,
or personnel administration tools do not follow a single power rationality. Caught in complex power games,
these techniques have distinctive historical backgrounds, ends, and effects. Such an approach, it is argued, allows
to develop a more complex understanding not only of the process through which mining companies localize their
operations, but also of the changes brought by Chinese capital in Africa.
1. Introduction
The Congolese copperbelt has been one of the most striking ex-
amples of the African mining boom in the 2000s. Following the decline
of the public enterprise Gécamines, the World Bank urged the
Congolese government to split its mining and industrial assets, and to
lease them to foreign investors. Supported by a new mining code in
2002, this liberalization of the copper mining sector resulted in an in-
flux of foreign companies drawn by the prospect of record profits. From
2004–2008, the price of copper quadrupled from US$2,000 to US
$8,000 per ton. Since then, a dozen mining projects — most in a joint
venture with Gécamines — have started the production phase.1 In-
dependent of these industrial mining projects, there has also been an
impressive expansion of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) since
the late 1990s. Tens of thousands of ‘creuseurs’ (artisanal miners) have
entered in Gécamines’ old quarries to mine heterogenite (a surface
oxidized ore rich in cobalt) or malachite (a surface oxidized ore rich in
copper), and industrial facilities (both smelters and hydrometallurgical
plants) were built on the outskirts of major towns to process these
minerals.
As the past twenty years have been marked by a number of mergers
and acquisitions, shareholders in several mining projects of the cop-
perbelt have changed several times. In the past few years, however,
there has been a clear rise in Chinese capital. In the 2000s, Gécamines
and the Congolese government have signed several mining contracts
with Chinese central State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the most famous
being the resource-for-infrastructure Sicomines deal. Additionally, fol-
lowing a process analogous to that described in Hilson et al. (2014) and
Crawford and Botchwey (2017) for Ghana, Chinese firms have gradu-
ally taken control of the ASM supply chain — that is, the marketing and
processing of heterogenite and malachite produced by ‘creuseurs’. Since
the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese involvement in the Congolese mining
sector has taken a new form. Beyond the mining projects developed by
Chinese central SOEs and processing facilities owned by Chinese firms,
several mining projects previously developed by private global com-
panies have been bought out by Chinese state, private, or mixed
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1 Industrial mining projects currently in the production phase include Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM, China Molybdenum), Mutanda Mining (MUMI, Glencore),
Kamoto Copper Company (KCC, Glencore), Sino-Congolaise des Mines (Sicomines, Sinohydro and China Railway), Minière de Kalumbwe Myunga (MKM, China
Railway), Compagnie Minière de Luisha (COMILU, China Railway), Minière de Kasombo (MIKAS, Huayou), Compagnie minière de Musonoi (COMMUS, Huayou),
Frontier (Eurasian Resources), Boss Mining (Eurasian Resources), la Société d’exploitation du Kipoi (SEK, Tiger Resources), Société Minière de Kinsevere (Minerals
and Metals Group), Ruashi Mining (Jinchuan), Chemicals of Africa (Chemaf, Shalina), Huachin Mabende (Huachin and China Non-Ferrous Metals) and Congo
Dongfang Mining (CDM, Congo Dongfang). This list does not include projects in the development phase or smelters and hydrometallurgical plants processing ore
from ASM.
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enterprises. This was the case, for instance, for the Tenke-Fungurume,
Kinsevere, Luiswishi, and, more recently, Kamoa-Kalula mining sites. If
these acquisitions by Chinese firms reflect a broader trend, especially in
the copper mining sector, it has been nowhere more visible than in the
Congolese copperbelt, where they now control more than half of the
operating mines.
Based on a case study, this article examines how new industrial
mining projects in the Congolese copperbelt have implemented their
human resources (HR) management policies. To what extent do these
policies break with that of Gécamines in the past? How have they been
adapted to the Congolese context? How do Chinese companies’ buyout
of mining projects impact HR policies? In answering these questions,
the analysis that follows aims to provide new insights into the ‘gov-
ernment’ of mining projects in Michel Foucault’s sense of the word.2
From this perspective, the corporation is viewed as an assemblage of
multiple governmental techniques that have different ends. The ana-
lysis is thus not about the essence of the corporation, its beneficial or
harmful nature, but about the practical methods through which it works
and how it structures its environment.3 Particular attention is paid to
the ‘strategic games’ involved in their implementation, as these games
can unmake the more or less stable ‘states of domination’ that these
governmental techniques aim to produce (see Foucault, 1994 [1984]).
Whether they explicitly build on Foucault’s work or not, several
social scientists have studied some of the power devices that mining
companies put in place, especially the securitized enclave (e.g.
Ferguson, 2005, 2006; Hönke, 2009, 2010; Appel, 2012) and CSR
programs (Szablowski, 2007; Rajak, 2011; Dashwood, 2012; Welker,
2014). These studies provide in-depth examinations of the struggles
involved in the making of such devices and their various power effects.
As such, they make an important contribution to the study of the
mining companies’ governmental practices advocated here. At the same
time, most tend to ascribe a certain rationality to the corporation as a
whole, if not to mining capitalism in general, from the study of a single
power device4 . In doing so, they miss a key point in Foucault’s ap-
proach, which requires taking the diversity of power devices, techni-
ques and tools at work inside mining companies into account (Rubbers,
2019a). In the analysis that follows, special attention will accordingly
be paid to the HR governmental techniques’ distinctive ends and effects.
Although crucial for understanding the how of mining capitalism,
HR management in mining companies has been given little attention in
the social science literature. Undoubtedly this neglect arises from the
notorious reluctance of mining companies to authorise researchers’
access to their facilities5 . Nonetheless, even those researchers who have
completed fieldwork inside a mining company— even sometimes in the
HR department — tended to use this access to study other issues: per-
sonnel nationalization policies (Burawoy, 1972), the workers’ experi-
ence (Gordon, 1977), CSR programmes (Rajak, 2011; Welker, 2014), or
the specificity of Chinese capitalism (Lee, 2010, 2017). While these
ethnographies provide detailed background information on different
aspects of the organization of work, they have not taken up HR policies
as a subject of analysis in their own right.
This article is based on research carried out within the framework of
the WORKinMINING project on the micropolitics of work in the mining
companies of Congo and Zambia funded by the ERC consolidator grant
programme (ID 646802). From 2016–2018, I completed multiple
fieldtrips in the Congolese copperbelt in order to meet the various ca-
tegories of actors (HR managers, unionists, labour inspectors, political
authorities, etc.) involved in the regulation of work in the mining
sector. Below I propose a case study on Shaba Mining, a small mining
project in which I had the opportunity to take up a month’s ‘internship’
in July and August 20176 . This mining project is of particular interest
in that it was first developed by Springbok, a South African junior
company, before it was taken over by Wang, a provincial Chinese SOE,
in 2012.
Before I begin the examination of HR policies at the mine, I will first
reconstruct the project’s history on the basis of Springbok annual re-
ports since 2004. These reports enable a better understanding of the
constraints that limited the project’s development, and the decisions the
majority shareholder have made to overcome them. I will then open the
doors of the HR department in order to study three governmental
techniques, namely recruitment, industrial relations, and personnel
administration, in more detail. For each technique, special considera-
tion will be given to the tools or procedures involved, their intended
ends, and the power games to which they give space. Finally, I will
examine the way in which Congolese employees have interpreted the
major changes Wang’s Chinese managers brought with them in HR
management since 2012. Focusing on various governmental techniques,
I argue in the conclusion, not only allows the development of a more
complex understanding of the process through which mining companies
localise their operations, but also of the changes brought by Chinese
capital in Africa.
2. A promising project
Situated close to one of the main Copperbelt cities, the Shaba
mining site was first developed by the colonial enterprise Union minière
from the 1910s onwards. The quarry complex that was then formed was
further enlarged by Gécamines – the name given to Union minière after
its nationalization – from the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the
1980s. In 1998, the L.-D. Kabila government demanded that Gécamines
give up the quarry to artisanal mining and, within a few months,
thousands of ‘creuseurs’ entered the site in search for heterogenite and
malachite. In 2000, however, mining rights over parts of the site were
2 For Foucault (2012 [1980]: 14), the government is a ‘set of techniques and
procedures aimed at the management of people’. Foucault returned to the
problem of government from various viewpoints throughout his work — e.g.
the production of norms, the well-being of the population, or the making of
subjectivities. In this article, I am more specifically interested in his analytics of
governmental techniques (for an overview, see Rose and Miller, 1992;
Lascoumes, 2004).
3 For greater precision, in the following pages I will distinguish three levels of
analysis in the study of mining companies’ governmental practices: devices or
policies (e.g. HR management); techniques (e.g. industrial relations, personnel
administration, etc.); and procedures or tools (e.g. union elections, IT tools,
etc.).
4 An exception is Marina Welker (2014), who draws attention to the multiple
ways in which the ‘corporation’ as an idea is enacted, depending on people and
circumstances. In my view, this approach presents another problem, that of
disintegrating mining projects into a multitude of practices and discourses and,
in so doing, of putting too much emphasis on the contingency of their opera-
tions: government techniques are so much dissolved in strategic games that it
becomes difficult to account for the development of mining projects, and of
mining capitalism more generally. The purpose of the approach advocated here
is less to destabilize the representation of the mining corporation as a mono-
lithic macro-actor than to bring to light the material, social, and symbolic work
necessary for developing mining projects through a focus on mining companies’
government techniques. Although these techniques have specific and distinctive
ends, they are aimed at making the environment in which mining companies
operate more stable and predictable – two fundamental conditions for the de-
velopment of capitalism according to Max Weber.
5 I obtained the authorization to do a research internship at a mining com-
pany’s HR department (the research on which this article is based) only after
being refused by five other companies.
6 At the beginning of my internship, a programme was established to allow
me to tour the different units of the HR department, to attend various meetings,
and to meet all the actors involved in the company’s HR policies. All the people
contacted during this internship were informed of my research objectives and
invited to give me their individual consent before answering my questions. To
protect them, I changed the names of the companies at the centre of this study. I
have also removed potentially sensitive passages at the HR manager’s request,
who read an earlier version of this manuscript.
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transferred to Shaba mining, a joint venture between Gécamines and an
exploration company, which sold its share in the project to a holding
company owned by Springbok in 2004. It is this junior company, which
further developed the project, that is the focus of this study.
During the first phase, Shaba Mining constructed a concentrator to
process the stockpiles and tailings left by Gécamines as well as the ore
bought from artisanal miners who had worked the site prior to its ta-
keover in 2004. The second phase, which began in 2008, consisted of
removing artisanal miners from the concession and starting mining
operations in two quarries. Process facilities were also constructed to
produce copper cathodes and cobalt hydroxides on site. Since 2010, the
company has opened a third pit and undertaken feasibility studies to
start mining the sulphide layer. For various reasons, however, this third
phase had yet to begin at the time of my internship in 2017.
Over the course of the 2000s, the boom in the price of commodities
allowed Springbok to make record profits and to expand its activities
through the acquisition of new mining and industrial projects in South
Africa, Ghana and Congo. In 2008, this expansion process was abruptly
halted by the financial crisis. Although several of its projects were al-
ready in the development phase, Springbok was unable to find funding.
To survive, it staked its all on Shaba Mining, which was, then, its most
promising project. The board of directors decided to sell other mining
projects in Southern Africa and to apply for overrated bank credits to
finance Shaba. This survival strategy, which centred on copper pro-
duction, seems to have been fruitful. Since 2009, the start-up of the new
plant at Shaba Mining and the upturn of copper prices have allowed
Springbok to stabilise its financial situation. When Wang bought the
group out in 2011 after outbidding a private global enterprise,
Springbrook was making profits again.
Following its acquisition, Springbok was incorporated as a sub-
sidiary of Wang International, a listed company established by Wang
(the provincial SOE) as a flagship for the development of its interna-
tional mining operations7 . Maintained as a separate entity, the com-
pany continued to operate mining projects in the Copperbelt from Jo-
hannesburg. Eventually, from 2014 onwards, Chinese managers were
appointed to the company’s board of directors in South Africa, and to
management positions in its projects in Congo and Zambia. Retro-
spectively, it appears that the Chinese provincial SOE used the South
African company as a vehicle to invest in Central Africa — a place
where it had no previous experience (Corkin, 2008). To some degree,
however, Wang was unlucky for, as soon as it had completed the ac-
quisition of Springbok, the price of copper began a long descent, from
US$8871 a ton in 2011 to US$4863 a ton in 2016. This downturn led
the company to slow down the development of new projects and, once
again, to focus on Shaba, its main project in Central Africa. At the same
time, the mine’s oxide reserves were nearly exhausted, and, to make
matters worse, the plant faced frequent power shortages. Between 2015
and 2016, Shaba Mining reported net losses. A graph showing the cost
curve dropping below the profit curve was posted in the offices at Shaba
to explain to workers that the situation was critical.
Faced with this adverse situation, the company implemented three
main measures. It decided to mine a cobalt-rich area in the mine in
order to take advantage of the rising price of this commodity after
20158 . It began to buy high grade oxide ore from traders involved in
artisanal mining to upgrade the ore that fed the plant9 . Finally, it cut
costs all round, including those of labour: wages were frozen for an
indeterminate period; a hundred unskilled workers employed in non-
core services (cleaning, security, catering) were laid off and transferred
to subcontractors; and South African expatriates were progressively
replaced by cheaper Chinese managers. These measures probably al-
lowed the enterprise to subsist without laying off more workers. In
2016, the company produced 32,000 tons of copper and 3200 tons of
cobalt — a little less than in previous years. Its production cost was still
higher than the copper sale price, but rising prices seemed to connote
the promise of a better future. During my fieldwork in mid-2017, the
company had returned to break even, and development projects that
had long been suspended (the construction of a new plant and the de-
velopment of new mines) were on their way back.
If the story of Shaba Mining has been eventful, it is not atypical. The
fact that it was set up by an exploration firm, developed by a junior
company, and then bought out by a large mining corporation is
common for small mines in boom periods. As a careful reading of Price
Waterhouse Cooper’s annual reviews on the mining industry’s global
trends show, the strategy followed by the world’s 40 top miners since
2004 has been similar to that of Springbok: in the boom years, they
reinvested their profits to acquire new projects; facing a lack of capital
after the financial crisis, they sought to scale back to their core business
and cut costs with the aim of reducing their debts and regaining in-
vestor confidence. As they had access to state capital for their overseas
operations, Chinese SOEs found themselves in a good position to take
advantage of the crisis, and to buy out mining projects in the Congo and
elsewhere. The Shaba Mining case can therefore be seen as a particular
manifestation of broader changes in the mining sector whose con-
sequences in the domain of work have yet to be analysed.
3. Three HR techniques
At the time of my fieldwork in 2017, Shaba Mining employed 1068
workers, including 52 expatriates. From 35–45 years of age, the ma-
jority of these workers had five to ten years’ seniority. As in most
mining companies, there were few women (5 %), and their presence
was concentrated in administrative departments. In addition to its
permanent workforce, the Shaba project provided employment to 1238
contract workers. Most of them were employed by two foreign com-
panies —one in charge of mining operations, the other of the site’s
security. The workers’ working conditions will not be discussed here. It
is sufficient to say that, with equivalent qualifications, their wages were
slightly lower than those who were directly employed by Shaba Mining.
Among the eight departments in the company, the process depart-
ment (the plant) was, with more than half the total workforce, by far
the most important. In comparison, the HR department was, with its 24
workers, of rather modest size. According to the original joint-venture
agreement, Gécamines was responsible for appointing the personnel
manager. Curiously, however, the public company had not exercised
this prerogative before 2011: The first two personnel managers were
directly recruited by the project. From 2011–2012, and then from 2013
to 2014, however, two Gécamines representatives took on the position,
the interim periods being covered by an experienced HR employee. I
was told that the South African management did not find either of these
Gécamines representatives suitable for the position. Against the
7 Like private global companies, Chinese SOEs create shell companies in tax
heavens to escape taxation. Springbok is thus the sole subsidiary of a company
registered in Mauritius, which is itself the main subsidiary of Wang
International (registered in the Cayman Islands). The buyout of Springbok was
not Wang’s first venture outside of China. In the previous months, this Chinese
provincial SOE had taken over three other foreign mining companies in South
Africa and Canada. In buying Springbok, its objective was to get a foothold in
the copper and cobalt mining sector and diversify its investment portfolio.
8 In comparison to the Zambian copperbelt, the Congolese copperbelt has also
important cobalt reserves. Long considered a by-product of copper, cobalt has
taken on new importance with the development of new technologies
(footnote continued)
(smartphones, laptops, tablets, etc.).
9 Artisanal miners have played a key role at several stages of the project’s
development. The opportunity to buy the production has allowed Shaba Mining
to take advantage of the commodity supercycle when it was still in the devel-
opment phase (2004-2008), and then to compensate for the depletion of its
oxide reserves in recent years (2014-2017). Far from being a completely se-
parate sector, artisanal mining is better viewed as a labour submarket, which is
in a subcontracting relationship with industrial mining (Rubbers, 2019b).
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background of a desire to implement a new strategic plan in 2014, the
Springbok group therefore decided to hire a HR professional itself, and
to create a new position for him in Shaba Mining, HR Manager.
This manoeuvre soon created tensions. A year after the arrival of
this professional, Gécamines responded by appointing a new personnel
manager for Shaba, and by demanding that the HR manager be con-
sidered his deputy. Rather than resorting to conflict, the two men
pragmatically accommodated themselves to this embarrassing situa-
tion. During my internship, they seemed to manage the department
congenially, taking care not to impinge on each other’s prerogatives.
The personnel manager was responsible for administration and re-
presentation duties— signing the documents, chairing the department’s
meetings, and sitting on the board of the heads of department — while
the Springbok-recruited manager led the new projects and developed
the company’s HR strategy.
The new HR manager’s arrival nonetheless increased tensions be-
tween some department staff. Upon assuming office, he recruited or co-
opted workers that he saw as ‘competent’ and ‘motivated’ and assigns
them to key positions. It is to them that he entrusts new projects, and it
is with them that he collaborates on day to day basis. The ‘old-timers’,
on the other hand, were relegated to administrative tasks of lesser in-
terest. This discrimination among colleagues resulted in the formation
of what HR officers see as two separate ‘clans’ in the department. As I
will explain below, far from being an exception specific to the HR de-
partment, these ‘clans’ are an essential part of the company’s informal
structure as a whole.
3.1. Recruitment
During the development phase, Shaba Mining had a small perma-
nent staff. When the project’s second phase began, it slowly started to
increase its workforce, from 400 in 2008 to 1200 workers in 2011.
Given the economic situation since then, no more than five people have
been recruited each year, principally to replace departing workers. In
view of the low number of job offers, the employee in charge of re-
cruitment in the HR department has lost a great deal of the importance
that he had in the past. Workers nevertheless continue to visit him in his
office to find out about possible vacancies and to try to obtain an in-
ternship for a relative. Internships are commonly viewed as the best
way for young graduates to get a job in the company and, more gen-
erally, in the mining sector.
Recruitment procedures differ for expatriate executives, national
skilled employees, and local unskilled workers, and correspond to sig-
nificant disparities in terms of hierarchical position and level of re-
muneration (see Rubbers, 2019a):
(a) Springbok’s head office in South Africa, and, increasingly, Wang
headquarters in China, recruits executives and technicians from the
international job market. In 2015, there were 53 (mainly South African)
expatriates from Springbok, and 5 (Chinese) from Wang. The following
year, the numbers were more balanced, with 26 Springbok expatriates
and 25 from Wang. The choice to hire expatriates rests on their tech-
nical (management recognizes their degrees), language (they speak the
same language as management), and moral (management trusts them)
skills. In the case of Chinese expats, their cost to the company is not
much higher than that of Congolese managers with the same qualifi-
cation.
(b) Since the project was established, the ‘local community’ has
been prioritized for recruiting unskilled labour. This acts as a means to
prevent social conflicts, secure the mining concession, and give the
image of a socially responsible corporation. Hiring this category of
workers was entrusted to the company’s social department, which
works in collaboration with different local stakeholders. The depart-
ment asks the neighbouring municipality’s mayor for a list of the in-
habitants, which is then used as a database of potential workers during
the recruitment process. Similar to other mining companies established
in rural areas, Springbok also takes the recommendations of customary
chiefs and other local authorities into consideration. Finally, as part of
the plan to remove artisanal miners from the concession (there were
about 3000 of them in 2004), a hundred of them were offered jobs as
security guards or as unskilled workers in the process department.
(c) Skilled employees — the majority of workers in Shaba Mining —
are directly recruited by the project’s HR department. To do so, it has
put a fairly standard recruitment procedure into place. Candidates
whose CVs are selected by the HR department must pass tests, then an
interview with a mixed committee. Despite its apparent objective
character, this procedure leaves room for certain managers to favour or
exclude candidates. The HR manager, who receives recommendations
from all sides, has the opportunity to sort and rank the CVs. In the
application files I was able to see, I came across reference letters with a
hand-written annotation from the HR manager that the recommended
candidates’ CVs should be placed on the top of the pile. At the end of the
selection process, however, the last word generally belongs to the head
of the department in which the candidate will work. If he already has a
candidate, the selection procedure is likely to be a mere formal exercise.
Some workers told me that they had been recruited by the company
without having passed any test. Following the instructions of their
sponsor, they signed a fixed-term contract, which was later converted
into a permanent contract.
This does not mean that all recruitment is based on favouritism.
Most of the skilled workers I met were recruited at Shaba Mining after
the tests without any personal support inside or outside the company.
Nevertheless, even when they have been recruited without the inter-
vention of a sponsor, many workers benefit from the support of a su-
pervisor who made them part of their ‘clan’ once they were already in
the company. For this reason, the relationships that bind workers to
their sponsor take various forms. While some feel strongly indebted,
others were just pleased that they enjoyed his confidence. Such ‘clans’,
which have from three to six members, were found in most depart-
ments. In order to secure a promotion or a transfer within the company,
it is important to have such a sponsor. As I observed in the HR de-
partment, it also plays a role in the everyday division of labour, with
the least interesting tasks falling on those excluded from the ‘clan’ in
power.
Far from having imposed an entirely new social order, the company
found itself to a large extent caught in the social networks of its
workers. These networks, which take the form of small, more or less
flexible, ‘clans’ do not follow the lines of tribal, provincial, or national
identity in any simple way. They are also based on other principles of
affinity such as belonging to the same church, living in the same
neighbourhood, or sharing the same understanding of what it means to
be a proficient worker. In this respect, Shaba Mining’s ‘clans’ mirror the
complex texture of Central African cities’ social life since the colonial
period (Balandier, 1955; Epstein 1958, 1992).
As a governmental technique, the recruitment process thus responds
to different ends, or power rationalities. Far from being only based on
cost and competence, it involves various moral, cultural, social, and
political considerations. Trust, loyalty, cultural intimacy, or the image
of the corporation as a responsible citizen are among the reasons given
to account for its organization across different channels and its effect on
the company. It leads to what Gabrielle Hecht (2002: 699) calls an
‘ethnotechnical hierarchy’, in which powers and privileges are un-
equally distributed between expatriate executives, national skilled
employees, and local unskilled workers.
3.2. Industrial relations
In D.R. Congo, the organisation of union elections in companies is
decreed by the government. At Shaba Mining, the first union delegation
(five members for 400 workers) was elected in 2008. It remained in
place until the 2014 elections, during which the number of seats in the
delegation was brought to ten (for 1000 workers) and distributed
among ten unions, with each union holding one seat. Such elections use
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secret ballots. As such, the unionists do not have any membership lists:
‘When you see them’, a shop steward told me, ‘they tell you that they
voted for you. But they say the same thing to the other delegates.’
In almost all the mining companies established in the Congo, the
employer deducts union dues from the workers’ salaries and gives these
dues to the unions according to the number of votes they obtained
during the last union elections. Shaba Mining, by contrast, chose to
equally distribute the dues it collected among the unions, without
taking into account the numbers of votes a particular union had ob-
tained. While such practices are not without issue, it nevertheless en-
sures a united and stable union delegation. Moreover, Shaba Mining has
decided to give substantial benefits to the shop stewards. During a
conversation in their office, they told me that they received a bonus of
US$150 per month, plus an attendance fee of US$200/day for the four
regular meetings that they have with the employer each year. In total,
they thus get a minimum of US$2600 per year in addition to their
annual salary. According to the HR officer in charge of industrial re-
lations, these amounts were fixed at the start of the project, when the
copper price was high and the delegation only had five members.
The 2008 union elections came at the right time for Shaba Mining. It
was recruiting an increasing number of workers to start production
(phase 2 of the project) and it needed to install a union delegation to
negotiate a collective agreement and find a solution to the problem of
salary scales. At the project’s start, like almost all new mining compa-
nies in Congo, Shaba Mining negotiated a global salary with the
workers on an individual basis, without taking into account the
Congolese labour code, which imposes a job classification with a salary
scale for each category of worker10 . This practice exposed the company
to the risk of being obliged to calculate bonuses, benefits, and taxes on
the basis of the global salary it offered to workers (instead of the base
salary), a considerable extra cost. It also created a situation whereby
workers who were equally qualified and were doing the same job were
paid differently. The installation of a union delegation and the in-
troduction of a job classification allowed Shaba Mining to avoid the
high tensions that have emerged in other mining companies, without
completely putting an end to wage inequalities among workers. Until
today, such inequalities result in demotivation among many workers.
As in all Congolese companies, the union delegates are easily sus-
pected of collusion with the employer. After all, they profit from their
roles as shop stewards and do not hesitate to present themselves as the
company’s ‘social partners’, whose role is to ‘educate’ the workers about
the requirements of industrial work. The story of the only Shaba Mining
strike since its creation provides a good illustration of this mistrust
towards the unions.
At the end of November 2015, the workers stopped work for three
days to protest an alleged mistake in the calculation of their wages,
which had led to an increase in the tax rate to their detriment. They
set up a picket line and demanded that they be allowed to meet with
the general manager. Before the latter acceded to their request,
however, the Security Department took the initiative to ask the
police to disperse the strikers. As the political situation in the
country at the end of 2015 was tense, the local state authorities (the
labour inspector, the governor, and the mayor) immediately in-
tervened to end the conflict and demand that a mixed committee of
experts study the problem. This committee concluded that the
company had not made any mistake, but encouraged it to change
the way in which it calculates wages in favour of the workers. It also
asked the company to not lay off the strike’s leaders, although they
had organized it illegally. As is usually the case in D.R. Congo, this
strike was organized by the workers, not by the unions. Fearing that
the shop stewards play into the hands of management, workers did
not tell them about the strike and refused to have them act as
mediators in the conflict. Negotiations were directly conducted by
representatives (the so-called ‘strike leaders’) whom they chose
themselves for the occasion.
The role of trade unions, however, is not only to educate the
workers and to preserve social peace. They are also expected to support
workers who are subjected to disciplinary actions, they bring their
grievances to the employer, and they defend workers’ interests when
the company initiates a collective redundancy procedure. According to
several HR officers, the workers owe shop stewards a certain number of
‘victories’ since the start of the project: salary increases, an annual
school bonus, the distribution of sacks of maize flour, a substantial
contribution to funeral fees, and so on. Since 2014, the new Chinese
management has frozen salary increases and some bonuses, but it has
nevertheless given in to some of the union delegation’s demands.
During my time in Shaba, the company had bought new buses to
transport the workers to the plant, and a new restaurant was being
constructed. It had also started to give plots of land outside the mining
concession to the workers. Finally, as copper and cobalt prices had
increased, it conceded to pay a production bonus for the last trimester
while also increasing salaries on the basis of seniority at the end of the
year.
From the management’s perspective, industrial relations comprise a
governmental technique aimed at educating the workers and pre-
venting labour conflicts. In the Shaba Mining’s case, the installation of a
union delegation did not prevent a work stoppage in 2015. The unions
failed to prevent it and was also unable to bring back the situation
under their control. As is generally the case in the Congo, it was the
workers who went on strike and the local authorities who mediated the
conflict. This does not mean, however, that trade unions play an in-
significant role in Shaba Mining. Since the start of the project, they have
indeed managed to obtain various bonuses and benefits that go beyond
what is legally required.
3.3. Administration
Since 2014, Springbok has sought to formalise and standardise the
HR management in the group’s companies. This plan has several di-
mensions: the de-layering of hierarchies; the standardization of job ti-
tles; the establishment of common rules and procedures; and the de-
velopment of IT management tools. In order to put this plan in place,
Shaba Mining, a company that had a reputation for being particularly
disorganised, recruited and appointed a HR manager. All my informants
referenced Shaba Mining’s disorganisation in the past. One HR officer,
for example, told me that, before his arrival in 2011, the workers’ files
were neither organised nor kept up to date. Thus, on payday, numerous
workers came to the HR department to file a complaint: their promo-
tion, or the birth of their last child, had not been taken into account in
the calculation of their salary. To put the files in order, he had to go into
the offices to collect the documents that were available (they were often
deposited on the floor) and then call in workers so he could obtain the
documents that were missing or incomplete.
Special efforts have been made within the framework of the new HR
plan to better control the workers and reduce the cost of fraud. One of
the first things that Springbok did was to construct automatic doors at
the entrance of its buildings, and to put a computerized time-atten-
dance system in place. Beforehand, the workers’ entry and exit times
were recorded by controllers in each department, who transferred at-
tendance lists to the HR department at the end of each week. As it was
relatively easy for the workers to work something out with the con-
trollers, both absenteeism and overtime were very high at that time.
Since the installation of the new doors, the workers arrive and leave on
time, and the number of hours they work is easily calculated by the
computer programme.
10 According to this mode of remuneration, all workers in the same category
are paid the same base salary, to which is added a series of bonuses and ben-
efits. The bonuses and benefits provided by the law are calculated as a per-
centage of the base salary.
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More recently, an IT specialist in the HR department was asked to
develop a biometric control programme to access the eleven health
centres to which Shaba Mining is affiliated. During my time there, the
HR department was preparing a campaign to count the workers and
their dependents, and to take their fingerprints digitally. Once the
system is in place, the IT officer in charge of the project told me, it will
be very difficult for a worker to have his girlfriend, or a distant relative,
treated at the company’s expense.
The development of these various control tools are part of the rise in
what sociologist Marie-Anne Dujarier (2015) calls ‘disembodied man-
agement’.11 In this management model, the workers tend to be treated
in a more abstract manner than in the past, through the use of computer
programmes. Although the use of such programmes is in tune with
recent developments in HR management doctrine, the purpose assigned
to them in Shaba Mining has been less to mobilise the workers — to
turn them into entrepreneurs of themselves, responsible for their work,
who participate in the development of the company on their own in-
itiative — than to restrain their behaviour. Reflecting a deep distrust of
the workers, who the management often considers to be exclusively
motivated by money, new policies and instruments have been put in
place in order to keep a watch on, control, and punish them.
The HR manager is clearly conscious of this limitation. For him, the
measures implemented since 2014 represent significant advances in the
modernisation of HR management at Shaba Mining, but this is still far
from being an ideal model in this domain: if, thanks to the time at-
tendance control system, the workers arrive on time, a number of them
‘twiddle their thumbs’ inside the company’s buildings. In his view, the
project’s HR function requires a more strategic ambition. This should go
beyond following bureaucratic procedures and foster a corporate cul-
ture favouring commitment to work. To do this, he would like to install
a performance evaluation scheme, new participative structures, and
flexible career plans. Inspired by the latest fashion in HR management,
these ideas are consistent with the strategic plan Springbok adopted in
2014. The HR manager is not sure, however, that the Wang’s Chinese
executive managers will support them: ‘The Chinese corporate culture’
he said to me, ‘is more authoritarian. The Chief gives an order, and the
workers obey’.
4. A Chinese cultural revolution
The HR manager’s reflection on Chinese corporate culture raises the
question of what changes the new majority shareholder has brought
into the HR governmental practices of Shaba Mining. Over the course of
the past decade, various civil society organisations have condemned the
working conditions in Chinese companies established in Africa. In re-
sponse to these attacks, many researchers — eager to deconstruct the
myths surrounding ‘Chinese imperialism’ — have stressed the influence
different factors have on Chinese labour practices: different firm types,
the sector in which they are involved, the length of their presence in the
country, the pressures exerted by the state and trade unions, or the
ethos of expatriate managers (see Baah and Jauch 2009; Gu, 2009;
Hairong and Sautman, 2013; Kernen and Lam, 2014; Lee, 2017; Lam,
2017; Fei et al., 2018; Oya and Schaefer, 2019). There are still few
empirical studies, however, and their main focus has been on the op-
erations of SOEs and their subsidiaries (Haglund, 2009, 2010; Lam,
2017; Lee, 2017). To my knowledge to date, no study has been con-
ducted on how Chinese companies have changed labour practices in
mining projects developed by investors from other countries. Focusing
on this type of investment can therefore shed new light on the dynamics
of Chinese capitalism in Africa.
Whether during ordinary conversations or in work meetings, the
Congolese workers often referenced how the new Chinese managers
from Wang have introduced changes since 2014. In their view, the
Chinese prioritize problems tied to production and cost control, leaving
the HR management to the South Africans and the Congolese. The main
reason my informants gave for this is that the Chinese are not interested
in motivating workers through incentives: the only important thing is
that they obey orders and do their work at the least cost. To this dif-
ference in managerial philosophy, they added the problem of language.
If Congolese workers already had difficulties in terms of mutual un-
derstanding with the South Africans, this was nothing in comparison to
those that they have with the Chinese. As Chinese managers’ command
of French or English is very limited, they are forced to use interpreters,
which considerably reduces their capacity to understand what is hap-
pening, particularly with regard to HR.
As the Chinese arrived at a time when the price of copper was below
its production costs, Wang’s strategy has primarily consisted of cutting
expenses. They broke or renegotiated the contracts that had been signed
with South African suppliers and sub-contractors. According to in-
formants, certain expatriate managers had a personal interest in these
contracts, which were greatly overvalued. In addition, they con-
siderably reduced personnel expenses, whether for promotions,
training, security equipment, or corporate cultural activities.
All of my informants acknowledged that the measures implemented
by the Chinese have improved Shaba Mining’s financial situation with
few job losses. A unionist thus conceded: ‘If they hadn’t come, the
company would be closed today. At the time, it was too much in debt
and the costs were too high’. From the workers’ point of view, however,
these cuts in labour costs were not solely the result of economic con-
siderations, imposed in response to a difficult situation, but also an
organizational choice that reflected a different work culture. This view
was expressed to make sense of the Chinese’s refusal to grant salary
increases: ‘These are people who only have one child, and you have
seven of them. They do not understand when you ask them for a wage
that allows you to take care of all these children’. Or of their reluctance
to offer training to workers: ‘I have an engineer in the department
whose training in South Africa was interrupted on the order of the
general manager. He said: ‘But why does the company have to pay for
his training? Who will benefit from it? It is not he himself’’. Thus, the
Congolese seemingly consider that, while the South Africans under-
stood the importance of motivating their personnel through various
incentives, the Chinese are unwilling to grant benefits beyond the legal
minimum.
A domain in which the austerity measures Wang implemented had a
particularly visible impact is safety. During my internship at Shaba
Mining, trucks in disrepair entered the concession every day to deliver
heterogenite and/or malachite ore to the plant. The vehicles’ speed was
no longer controlled, and the drivers were no longer required to wear
their seat belts. On several occasions, Chinese subcontractors were seen
without the appropriate personal protective equipment. According to
the head of the safety department, who had only three officers under
him, there has been a general relaxation of discipline among workers:
the workers put on their safety glasses only when he is passing, and
minor accidents are no longer reported to him. Although these beha-
viours have not yet resulted in a serious accident, they deviate from the
‘safety first’ rule that prevails in the mining sector. This decline in safety
standards since the arrival of the Chinese could be explained by the fact
that the bodies that fund the project do not require Wang to submit to
compliance audits. Most of my Congolese informants, however, did not
understand this lack of concern for safety rules and procedures solely as
a matter of finance, but also as the product of a culture that attaches
little value to workers’ lives — a stereotype with a long history in the
West (Hairong and Sautman, 2013). They compared this corporate
culture with that of the South African managers, who granted the safety
11 For Dujarier, the rise of this new management derives less from a cost-
benefit analysis than from the imitation of the dominant actors in the sector. In
support of this hypothesis, the person responsible for the new HR plan at
Springbok in South Africa comes from a major mining company. In D.R. Congo,
Shaba Mining’s HR officers constantly compared the management instruments
given to them with those put in place in the larger copperbelt companies.
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department the necessary means to fulfil its mission, and set an example
by strictly following the rules.
Most Congolese workers agreed that the cuts in labour costs have
resulted in a general demotivation: ‘The bosses don’t care about us’, one
of them told me, ‘they want the work to get done, but they ignore our
needs, so we limit ourselves to the minimum’. Even the decline in safety
reduced their pride in working for Shaba Mining, which is now con-
sidered as a worse employer than private global companies. This de-
motivation was palpable in my informants’ narratives, even though few
of them were considering leaving the company. Opportunities in the
labour market were few, and they had little chance to find a higher
paying job near a city.
5. Conclusion
This article aimed to reconstruct how new mining projects in the
Congolese copperbelt have implemented their HR management po-
licies: To what extent do these policies break with that of Gécamines in
the past? How have they been adapted to the local context? How do
Chinese company buyouts of mining projects affect HR policies? To
answer these questions, I proposed the case study of a mining project
developed by a South African junior company and then bought out by a
Chinese SOE, in which I had the opportunity to do on a one-month
internship. Drawing inspiration from Foucault’s work, this study has
paid special attention to the variety of government techniques the
company’s HR management has implemented since the start of the
project in 2004.
In comparison to Gécamines, Shaba Mining has brought several
innovations to HR management (outsourcing, IT tools, audit proce-
dures, etc.). These new HR techniques and tools have been widely
disseminated in the mining sector during the recent boom of foreign
investments and can be associated with broader changes in global ca-
pitalism — what is commonly called ‘neoliberalism’, ‘flexible accumu-
lation’, or ‘post-Fordism’. At the same time, the case of Shaba Mining
shows that these techniques have been appropriated selectively and co-
exist with older governmental techniques and tools (recruitment
methods, collective agreements, personnel archives, etc.). Taken to-
gether, these various techniques do not respond to a single principle of
government. The techniques for recruitment, industrial relations, and
personnel administration follow various power rationalities. Caught in
complex power games, they also produce their own distinctive effect(s).
To study how governmental techniques are put into place inside one
company can lead to a more complex understanding of the way in
which mining capitalism meets the ground in different parts of the
world. In their research on the Zambian mining sector, just on the other
side of the border, Haglund (2009, see also 2010) and Lee (2010; see
also 2017) depict the development of new mining projects as a re-
ciprocal learning process through which foreign investors’ managerial
practices come to be progressively adapted to the local context (see also
Lam, 2017). At a certain level of generality, the Shaba Mining case
confirms this analysis. It had to comply with the labour law, it had to
make concessions to the unions, and through the recruitment process, it
found itself to a large extent embedded in its workers’ social networks.
This narrative of progressive localisation overlooks, however, the
diversity and complexity of the processes involved. Shaba Mining’s case
suggests that these vary from one domain (power device, technique, or
tool) to another, and that they do not necessarily develop in a linear,
incremental, way. In the case of safety, for instance, rules and proce-
dures were directly imported from South Africa, and imposed on Shaba
Mining. These were considered to be more advanced than those
Gécamines formerly used, and they were implemented locally without
much room for adaptation. Respect for their application was, however,
relaxed after the Chinese SOE Wang bought the project. In the case of
HR, in contrast, Shaba Mining did not immediately import a model.
Rules and procedures were developed locally by the project’s managers
in collaboration with young Congolese managers. As their principal
preoccupation was to produce copper and cobalt as quickly as possible
in order to profit from the commodity supercycle, they did not follow a
coherent HR strategy. They improvised piecemeal solutions without
considering the longer-term consequences.
This improvisation in regard to HR management is certainly not
unique to Shaba Mining. It can be seen across the mining companies
that have started production in the course of the last decade. For Shaba
Mining’s HR manager, who has previously worked in three other (non-
Chinese) mining companies, the way in which new investors put their
HR policies in place has long been based on trial and error. It was only
several years later, after the price of copper had begun to drop, that HR
management was entrusted to experts who were charged with de-
signing a new strategic plan and adapting it to the local regulatory
framework. To use Lévi-Strauss’s (1962) famous analogy, the HR policy
of Shaba Mining was first elaborated according to the concrete logic of
the ‘bricoleur’, and then resumed along the lines of the abstract logic of
the ‘ingénieur’.
Finally, the analysis above sheds light on the HR management po-
licies of Chinese companies that have bought out mining projects de-
veloped by investors from other countries. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, the Shaba Mining case is not isolated: in the past decade,
the Congolese copperbelt — and, to a lesser extent, the global copper
mining sector — has witnessed an upsurge in Chinese companies’
merger and acquisition activities. In the HR management domain, the
main change that Wang brought about at Shaba Mining has been an
across-the-board reduction in labour costs. According to Congolese
workers, this cost-cutting strategy reflects a cultural ethos and a lack of
concern for their own expectations. It seems, however, difficult to at-
tribute this specific strategy to culture alone — all the more so since
Wang took over the project just before a downturn in copper and cobalt
prices, and all mining companies producing these commodities have
sought to reduce labour costs in recent years. Moreover, Wang has left
the HR function largely in the hands of the South African team.
In fact, the comparison of the different mining projects established
in the Congolese copperbelt suggests that projects bought out by
Chinese SOEs like Wang could offer a better bargain to workers than
those developed by private global companies (e.g. Glencore) or Chinese
SOEs (e.g. Sicomines)12 . As they take control of operating mines, these
investors tend to maintain the terms of employment and the HR man-
agement practices established by their predecessor. The wages in
companies such as Shaba Mining are thus in the range of those offered
by global private companies, approximatively thirty percent above
those in projects run by Chinese SOEs. At the same time, as they benefit
from state funding, they generally have the opportunity to provide
more stable jobs than private global companies who strive to maximize
short-term profits for their shareholders. Although it has experienced
hard times since 2012, Shaba Mining did not organize mass layoffs like
large private global companies have; its workforce numbers have re-
mained relatively stable, and it has continued to work with the same
subcontractors. It remains to be seen, however, if this provisional
analysis will hold true for the future developments of Shaba and other
mining projects bought out by Chinese companies. After all, the recent
history of the Congolese mining sector has been marked by rapid and
unexpected changes, and there are strong reasons to believe that this
12 This tentative analysis builds on C.K. Lee (2017). In her comparative study
of mining companies in the Zambian copperbelt, she shows that NFCA, a mining
project run by a Chinese SOEs, offers more stable jobs but lower wages than
projects run by private global companies such as Glencore or Vedanta. She
explains the greater stability of employment found at NFCA by the fact that it
benefits from the support of the Chinese state, which has strong strategic and
diplomatic interests in the African mining sector. Thus, this support allows its
management to work in a longer-term perspective, while it also makes it more
sensitive to local pressures for preserving jobs and improving conditions of
employment. Following the rise of the Patriotic Front in the second half the
2000s, such pressures were particularly high in Zambia.
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will continue.
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